- Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (Wikipedia)
The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP) or Theologico-Political Treatise, is a 1670 work of philosophy written in Latin by the Dutch philosopher Benedictus Spinoza (1632–1677). The book was one of the most important and controversial texts of the early modern period. Its aim was “to liberate the individual from bondage to superstition and ecclesiastical authority.” In it, Spinoza expounds his views on contemporary Jewish and Christian religion and critically analyses the Bible, especially the Old Testament, which underlies both. He argues what the best roles for state and religion should be and concludes that a degree of democracy and freedom of speech and religion works best, such as in Amsterdam, while the state remains paramount within reason. The goal of the state is to guarantee the freedom of citizens. Religious leaders should not interfere in politics. Spinoza interrupted his writing of his magnum opus, the Ethics, to respond to the increasing intolerance in the Dutch Republic, directly challenging religious authorities and their power over freedom of thought. He published the work anonymously, in Latin, rightly anticipating harsh criticism and vigorous attempts by religious leaders and conservative secular authorities to suppress his work entirely. He halted the publication of a Dutch translation. One described it as being “Forged in hell by the apostate Jew working together with the devil”. The work has been characterized as “one of the most significant events in European intellectual history”, laying the groundwork for ideas about liberalism, secularism, and democracy.
- In the next place, I attentively examined what I was, and as I observed that I could suppose that I had no body, and that there was no world nor any place in which I might be; but that I could not therefore suppose that I was not; and that, on the contrary, from the very circumstance that I thought to doubt of the truth of other things, it most clearly and certainly followed that I was; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although all the other objects which I had ever imagined had been in reality existent, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that “I,” that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is.
- Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of Geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams.